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1. Introduction 
The expansion of large-format supermarkets in recent decades has offered opportunities 
for brands to grow in number, varieties, and sales.  Increasingly, though, brands have come 
under competitive pressure from retailers keen to promote private label and facing budget-
conscious consumers less loyal to brands and who are willing to buy private label positioned 
as a cheaper alternative (Kumar and Steenkamp 2007).  As brands lose customer loyalty and 
sales share to private label then their selling power declines (Steiner 2004).  Retailers might 
then want to encourage shoppers to switch to buying private label, promoting their own goods 
while also enhancing their bargaining power over brand suppliers. Yet, would retailers go as 
far as intentionally undermining brands to favour private label?  This paper considers this 
question in terms of how retailers set and adjust the prices of branded goods and their me-too 
private label equivalents. 
Brands have traditionally held an important role for supermarkets, providing familiar 
products and variety to attract shoppers.  However, the development of equivalent-quality 
private label goods has reduced the need for brands as must-stock items in many categories, 
with many consumers willing to switch to buying private label equivalents if there is a 
sufficient cost saving.  Accordingly, the price gap between these types of products can be 
crucial in influencing their respective sales, as might perceptions of the relative value on offer 
(Steenkamp et al. 2010).  Specifically, price levels and the nature of price adjustments may 
shape reference prices and so influence how consumers perceive whether a brand or its private 
label equivalent offers better value for money, for given pairs of prices (Dhar and Hoch 1997; 
Lamey et al. 2012).  Thus, by judiciously setting and adjusting prices, a retailer could influence 
the perceived value for money on offer and steer consumers towards buying private label.  This 
paper considers four different pricing tactics that could achieve this aim. 
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At issue is a more general problem for brand owners, caught in a situation where retailers 
serve as their customers also act as their competitors, in producing private label equivalents.  
This double-agent position for retailers puts their respective interests in conflict, where brand 
owners might wish to monopolise category sales but retailers might want to sell private label 
at the expense of brands (Bell et al. 1997; Dobson 1998).  In controlling all the in-store 
marketing levers, what is to stop retailers undermining brands?  There are two possibilities.  
Firstly, brand owners could apply pressure themselves, such as a boycott threat to withhold 
supplies, or bribe retailers through extra payments to safeguard sales (e.g. via slotting 
allowances, overriding discounts, loyalty rebates, or funded price promotions).  Even so, the 
former is only credible if there are alternative routes to market and brand loyalty is stronger 
than store loyalty (so the brand owner suffers less than the retailer) while the latter might only 
exacerbate the problem, encouraging retailers to find further ways to undermine brand sales 
and so extract even higher payments.  Secondly, competition amongst retailers might regulate 
retailers’ behaviour, ensuring they price and market brands fairly.  However, if they share the 
same motivation, then they might all adopt the same behaviour, so pricing could be distorted 
and yet still be competitive overall.  In essence, a competitive outcome could have all retailers 
deliberately steering sales towards private label. 
Ultimately, there must be a limit to squeezing brands, otherwise they would not be 
stocked at all.  One reason for continuing to stock brands alongside private label is how they 
could work in tandem, segmenting brand loyal and switcher consumers (Soberman and Parker 
2006; Gabrielsen and Sørgard 2007, Perloff et al. 2012; Dobson and Chakraborty 2014).  In 
this regard, consumers might see the product types as substitutes (choosing one or the other) 
but the retailer might view them as complements (needing both of them for the purpose of 
segmenting consumers).  Even so, the brand and private label pricing relationship required for 
effective segmentation might well change as competitive conditions change.  
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To examine these issues, this paper analyses the pricing of matched pairs of branded 
grocery items and private label equivalents across competing retailers over a five-year period 
in which market conditions distinctly change.  The results show that the retailers price private 
label in a fundamentally different manner to pricing brands.  Price correlations between brands 
and their private label equivalents are only moderate, and price movements for the two product 
types tend to be noticeably different. The identified pricing patterns for these products are 
consistent with the view that retailers deliberately treat brand and private label prices 
differently.  In particular, the identified pricing patterns are indicative of retailers manipulating 
prices for the sake of segmenting consumers rather than displacing brands.   
The rest of the paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 sets out the conceptual 
background, reviewing the relevant literature and discussing why and how retailers might 
favour private label. Section 3 considers how switch marketing may operate through 
manipulating the pricing of brands and private label equivalents, highlighting four pricing 
tactics that a retailer might employ to favour private label.  Section 4 describes the sample and 
timeframe for the analysis of matched pairs of branded and private label equivalent goods.  
Section 5 presents the evidence on the observed pricing patterns.  Section 6 concludes the paper 
by discussing the implications of the findings and suggestions for future research.   
 
2. Private label favouritism and switch marketing 
The double-agent situation, with a retailer acting as a brand producer’s customer and 
competitor, means that their trading interests will not be aligned (Bell et al. 1997; Dobson and 
Chakraborty 2009; 2014). The brand producer will want to control category sales while the 
retailer will want sales for its own private label goods.  However, as the gatekeeper to the 
market, the retailer has the advantage that it controls the retail marketing mix in determining 
which products it stocks, where to place them, and how to price and promote them (Dobson 
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2005).  With this control, the retailer could then use the in-store marketing levers to advance 
its own private label offering even if this comes at the expense of restricting brand sales.   
But why should a retailer deliberately favour private label? Bunte et al. (2011) suggest 
six distinct business advantages for a retailer in favouring private label (“PL”) over brands.  
Table 1 summarises the reasons behind these six advantages and the relevant literature.1 
Table 1. Retailer advantages in favouring private label over brands 
Source of  advantage Reasons Literature 
1. Higher margins Retailer obtains lower supply prices 
on PLs by saving on brand marketing 
costs and free riding on brand 
investments allowing for higher 
margins when pricing private labels 
just below brands 
Higher percentage margins: Hoch and Banerji 
1993; Narasimhan and Wilcox 1998; Raju et al. 
1995; Barsky et al. 2001; Sayman et al. 2002, 
Pauwel and Srinivasan 2004; Steiner 2004; 2009. 
Yet, lower absolute margins: Corstjens and Lal 
2000; Ailawadi and Harlam 2004 
2. Facilitating 
consumer 
segmentation 
Retailer targets high priced brand at 
quality-conscious consumers and 
lower priced PL at price-conscious 
consumers, using multiple price-
quality tiers to increase category sales 
Theory: Wolinsky 1987; Gabrielsen and Sørgard 
2007; Perloff et al. 2012; Dobson and 
Chakraborty 2014. Brand prices increasing upon 
PL entry: Kim and Parker 1999; Pauwels and 
Srinivasan 2004; Ward et al. 2002. 
3. Promoting retail 
brand to build 
consumer loyalty 
Retailer uses lookalike PLs to draw 
quality inferences from the leading 
brands while appearing to offer 
increased choice and value 
Corstjens and Lal 2000; Sudhir and Talukdar 
2004; Ailawadi et al. 2008; González-Benito and 
Martos-Partal 2012; Seenivasan et al. 2015; 
Coelho do Vale et al. 2016. 
4. Retailer 
differentiation and 
reduced price 
comparability 
Retailer uses its exclusive PLs as a 
point of differentiation from rivals, 
making it harder for consumers to 
make like-for-like price comparisons 
Walters and Rinne 1986; Dobson 1998; 
Corstjens and Lal 2000; Ailawadi et al. 2008; 
Seenivasan et al. 2015.  
5. Weakening brand 
producer’s 
bargaining position 
Retailer uses its PL provides a 
credible alternative to counter brand 
withholding threats and leverage to 
secure more favourable trading terms 
Scott-Morton and Zettelmeyer 2004; Lal 1990; 
Narasimhan and Wilcox 1998; Sayman et al. 
2002; Ailawadi and Harlam 2004; Meza and 
Sudhir 2010; Ellickson et al. 2017. 
6. Creating revenue 
synergies across 
categories 
Retailer leverages PL success in one 
category to encourage consumers to 
experiment with PL in other 
categories 
Sayman and Raju 2004a (positive umbrella 
effect); Chintagunta 2002 (under-pricing PL to 
maximise PL share); Sudhir and Talukdar (2004) 
(loyalty and differentiation benefits relate to the 
PL range breadth). 
Given that the retailer might have strong motives to favour private label over brands, it 
is natural then to consider how it could operate this favouritism. To the extent that retail 
                                                     
1 See also Bergès-Sennou et al. 2004; Sayman and Raju 2007; Pauwels and Srinivasan 2009; Sethuraman 2009; 
Hyman et al. 2010; Sethuraman and Raju 2012; Sethuraman and Gielens 2014; Dobson and Zhou 2014. 
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competition allows for some flexibility, the retailer has at its disposal control over all “4 Ps” in 
the marketing mix to influence purchasing decisions and, if it so chooses, encourage consumers 
to switch to buying private label instead of brands (Meza and Sudhir 2010).  To illustrate how 
extensive are the possibilities, Table 2 shows for each of the 4Ps a range of switch marketing 
tactics, some quite blatant and others more subtle, along with examples in practice. 
 
Table 2. Retailer switch marketing tactics to favour private label over brands 
Variable Switch Marketing Tactics Retailer examples 
Product - influence consumers’ product choices by 
controlling the product range stocked 
- develop me-too and copycat PL with very 
similar formulation and packaging to 
established brands 
- use advanced brand design knowledge to 
introduce or reposition private label 
equivalents  
- provide multiple PL quality tiers (budget, 
standard, and premium) to flank and squeeze 
brands;  
- delist weaker brands and brand variants 
- Brand delisting trials (Leyland 2006; Smith 
2009) 
- Copycat PL undermining leading brands 
(Poulter 2009; Quinn 2017) 
- Store-wide range reviews used to delist brands 
and multiple brand variants (Quinn 2016a; 
Perkins 2017a) 
- PL “ghost brands” trading on the halo value of 
established brands (Halliwell 2015) 
- Introduction of PL “venture brands” as 
distinctive premium PL targeting leading 
brands (Bamford 2012; 2013) 
Price - price lookalike PL just below brand price to 
signal quality equivalence 
- widen the price gap to give PL the appearance 
of better value for money  
- juggle brand prices to alter consumers’ 
perceptions about their underlying value and 
worth 
- Increasing brand prices faster than PL prices 
while reducing brand shelf space (Perkins 
2017b) 
- Artificially inflated brand prices used in yo-yo 
discount pricing (CMA 2015; CHOICE 2014) 
- Bait and switch tactics on out of stock brands 
(Ball 2009a; Hickman 2009) 
Place - influence consumers’ accessibility to products 
through control of in-store product placement, 
shelf allocation and number of facings 
- shelve lookalike PLs adjacent to brands to 
suggest quality equivalence 
- charge brands (but not PL) slotting allowances 
for prominent display space with high footfall 
- Favourable shelf space allocation for PL 
(Fernandez Nogales and Gomez Suarez 2005) 
- Using range reviews to remove brands and 
increase shelf space for PL (Quinn 2016b) 
- Increasing shelf space fees for brands 
(Economist 2015) 
- PL eye level shelf positioning (Steiner 2004) 
Promotion - direct consumers’ attention to PL through in-
store advertising, displays and taste tests 
- use mass media advertising campaigns 
(“switch and save”), targeted advertising (“see 
cheaper alternative!”), and personalised 
marketing (e.g., using loyalty card data) to 
shift demand to PL 
- give vouchers and coupons to buy PL 
- Compare and save campaigns in the US (Vogel 
2004; Gates 2008), Australia (Palmer 2009), 
Germany (Olbrich et al. 2009) and UK 
(Leyland et al. 2008; Grocer 2009) 
- PL vs brand blind taste tests (Gallagher 2008; 
Grew 2009) 
- Coupons and giveaways for PL when buying 
brands (Tarnowski 2004; Gates 2008) 
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Switch marketing, with the kinds of practices listed in Table 2, is far from a new 
phenomenon.  Over one hundred years ago, Hurd and Zimmerman (1914, p. 41) wrote about 
bait and switch tactics where aggressive retailers would use nationally advertised goods as 
‘leaders’ and pay their clerks premiums to switch customers to private brands or ‘long-shot’ 
goods when the customers asked for an advertised brand.  However, it is really in the last two 
decades that pushing consumers towards buying private label instead of brands has come to the 
fore as retailers have extended their PL ranges with multiple quality tiers and multiple variants 
to rival the leading brands (Kumar and Steenkamp 2007).   
The squeeze on brands has been particularly noticeable in Europe over recent years, 
where private label has rapidly increased its share, to the point where it accounts for more than 
two-fifths of sales in Switzerland, the UK and Spain, and more than a quarter of sales in the 
majority of EU countries (Nielsen 2014).  The squeeze has mostly profoundly affected 
secondary and tertiary brands.  For example, in the UK, while private label accounts for 41% 
of sales, a similar level at 40% comes from the category leader, leaving only 19% from all other 
brands.  In contrast, in the U.S., the retail market is much less concentrated and private label 
growth has been slower, with only 17% of sales coming from private label, 31% by the category 
leader, and 52% from all other brands (Nielsen 2014).  Nevertheless, even in the U.S., private 
label appears to be advancing at the expense of brands, especially as retailers specialising in 
private label, like Costco, Aldi, Trader Joe’s, expand their store networks and online sales, 
encouraging retail rivals to focus more on private label sales (Stores 2018). 
As the examples in Table 2 highlight, retailers may be quite open in favouring private 
label and challenging the position of brands. For instance, retailers might conduct high profile 
delisting trials, temporarily delisting individual brands and only reintroducing them if there is 
a discernible drop in trade in that category. Blatant favouritism towards private label also comes 
from advertising and promotional campaigns specifically encouraging consumers to switch 
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from buying more expensive brands to cheaper private label, featuring slogans like “compare 
and save” and “switch and save”.  Retailers might also intentionally develop copycat private 
labels, directly imitating leading brands in respect of their formulation, packaging, and appeal, 
and thereby free riding on the image and goodwill that brands have built up through their 
product and marketing investment.  Other ploys that retailers might use include giving 
favourable shelf space allocation, by awarding private label with a greater number of facings 
and mid-shelf, eye-level placement as well as special product displays.  
However, there are limits to how far retailers might want to be seen openly undermining 
brands, which have considerable value to consumers and so puts the retailer at risk of losing 
sales if it goes too far in reducing the presence or attraction of buying brands.  Also, brand 
producers can be expected to fight back, using advertising to connect with consumers to build 
brand loyalty, threatening retailers with withdrawal of promotional support, and taking legal 
action against copycats to protect against infringements of intellectual protect rights. Rarely, 
though, will brand producers go as far as to withhold supplies or boycott a retailer, where a 
trade war is likely to be harmful to both sides unless the brand is a true must-stock product such 
that consumers will shop elsewhere to buy.2   
While consumer loyalty to primary brands offers some protection, secondary or tertiary 
brands appear much more vulnerable and at greater risk of being replaced by private label. 
Nevertheless, there are more subtle means that retailers might use to favour private label over 
all types of brands and that comes through the retailer’s control over retail pricing.  The next 
section considers different approaches to strategic pricing that could favour private label as a 
prelude to the empirical analysis examining pricing behaviour for a matched-pairs sample.  
 
                                                     
2  As an example, see Benady (2009), but this is an extreme instance that involved the delisting of 250 Unilever 
products by the retailer, so restricted choice across a wide number of product categories. 
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3. Strategic pricing favouring private label 
While retailers may seek to adopt quite open or blatant discrimination in favour of private 
label through product selection, placement, and promotion, there is also the option to adopt 
strategic pricing as a perhaps more subtle form of private label favouritism, at least to the 
unassuming consumer if not the brand producer observing sales or margins slide.  This relies 
on the retailer having some latitude over the item-level prices it can set, which could reasonably 
apply in a multiproduct retailing context where shoppers purchase a bundle of goods as a basket 
rather than single items (Bliss 1988; Thomassen et al. 2017; Armstrong and Vickers 2018).   
Meza and Sudhir (2010) suggest that strategic pricing might occur as just a temporary 
phase, allowing a new private label to build up market share and critical economies of scale 
before the retailer goes back to category profit maximising pricing. However, it is conceivable 
that a retailer may be interested in playing a longer game of advancing the position of private 
label or using strategic pricing as a “slow burning” effect in shaping consumer price 
expectations, and in the process their quality perceptions and buying behaviour, as a gradual 
process over time.  For instance, Chintangunta’s (2002) empirical results are consistent with 
the view that the retailer may take a longer-term perspective in building up private label at the 
individual category level as this can help facilitate private label expansion into other areas. 
In taking a perspective that a retailer may wish to build private label volume or extract 
greater category revenue from more effective consumer segmentation and price targeting, there 
are four particular pricing tactics that the retailer might find useful in developing over time to 
raise sales of a me-too private label at the expense of an imitated brand: 
1. “Rip-Off Brand” tactic – The retailer raises brand prices to such a level as to choke off 
demand encouraging consumers to switch to the less costly, better value own label, while 
capturing increased surplus from those consumers remaining loyal to the brand. 
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2. “Private Label Value Champion” tactic – The retailer lowers private-label prices to 
enhance their perceived value for money and make brands look over priced and poor 
value, thus more effectively targeting value-conscious consumers. 
3. “Same-Quality-But-Better-Value Private Label” tactic – The retailer prices the private 
label close to the brand to encourage consumers to think they are of equal quality but 
with the private label offering slightly better value through its slightly lower price as an 
umbrella pricing tactic. 
4. “Dubious Brand Value” tactic – The retailer raises and lower prices of brands in a 
repeating up-down yo-yo manner to confuse the consumer as to their real value and 
encourage trial of more consistently priced private label. 
Figure 1 illustrates each of these four tactics, showing the relationship between the brand 
price and its private label equivalent over time.  
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Figure 1. Strategic pricing tactics 
1. “Rip-Off Brand” Tactic 
 
 
2. “Private Label Value Champion” Tactic 
Figure 3. “Same-Quality-Better-Value Private 
Label” Tactic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. “Dubious Brand Value” Tactic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The viability of each tactic is likely to depend on the precise circumstances and nature of 
the brand and private label products involved.  The first two tactics involve the retailer 
increasing the price gap between the brand and the private label over time.  In the former case, 
the retailer raises the brand price while holding the private label price constant.  This may be 
an attractive option when it allows the retailer to capture more surplus from heavily advertised 
brands with loyal consumers (e.g. Kim and Parker 1999; Bonfrer and Chintagunta 2004; 
Soberman and Parker 2006).  As Kumar and Steenkamp (2007, p. 104), Meza and Sudhir 
(2010) and Ezrachi and Reynolds (2009) note, though, price transparency across retailers and 
consumers willing to shop around for the lowest prices may limit the extent of this tactic.  
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However, if all retailers think similarly then they would all have increased scope for employing 
the tactic.  Accordingly, in employing this tactic, one might expect to see all rival retailers 
using it on that particular product, and in that way keep the brand’s price in step with each 
other.  Close price monitoring and tracking by the retailers may assist this process as they seek 
to keep prices closely aligned and move in step with each other when making price adjustments. 
With the second tactic, the retailer increases the price gap by lowering the private label 
price, which may be a straightforward penetration pricing tactic, which is consistent with 
Chintagunta’s (2002) results suggesting the retailer uses the tactic to build private label share.  
The downside is that if consumers view private label across retailers as substitutable then it 
may exacerbate price competition, which could lead to the private label pricing becoming 
permanently lower rather than just temporarily so.  Accordingly, if retailers are sensitive to 
rivals setting lower prices on private label, and taking away their mantle as a value champion, 
then they may respond in equal measure, so one player adopting the tactic may trigger all other 
players to follow suit.  This raises the possibility of all retailers finding themselves stuck in a 
rut whereby no player wants to be the first to raise prices, unless there is the possibility of a 
retailer acting as a price leader in raising prices that the others then follow.  
The third tactic represents a standard form of umbrella pricing where the retailer shields 
private label just below the high brand price to earn high margins (e.g. Competition 
Commission 2000).3  In this context, the retailer sets the private label price just below the brand 
to signal to consumers that the private label quality is near identical to the mimicked brand, 
even if PL price bears little relationship to the underlying private label cost.  Again as a tactic, 
this is only likely to be sustainable if the rival retailers also adopt the same behaviour, such that 
                                                     
3 The Competition Commission (2000) relates umbrella pricing to the situation in which the price of the national 
brand “effectively sets an upper limit for the pricing structure of the entire product group” (p. 139).  The 
observation made was that the prices of the own brands do not seem to be based on the marginal costs of the 
product, but rather pegged to the price of the leading national brand.  See also Olbrich and Grewe (2013). 
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the tactic could break down if one retailer began cutting private label prices to bring them more 
into line with costs.  The tactic could also fail if consumers reject the private label quality 
inference and see it as inferior to the brand, and in seeking to avoid this possibility then the 
retailer might purposefully design the private label to mimic the brand as closely as possible in 
terms of appearance, formulation, and packaging. 
The fourth tactic serves to confuse the consumer as to the true value of the brand, and 
whether it offers good value for money when at one moment it has a very low price and, at the 
next moment, it has a very high price. The retailer juxtaposes this volatile brand pricing with 
stable pricing on the private label, which thereby appears to offer more consistent and certain 
value for money.  In a sense, this portrays the difference between the relative attractions of 
high-low promotional pricing and everyday low pricing, only here carried out in the same store. 
However, high frequency price discounting can affect consumers’ perceptions of the 
appropriate reference price, which in turn could undermine consumer willingness to pay and 
adversely affect brand loyalty (Mazumdar et al. 2005).  Even if the brand producer recognises 
that yo-yo prices can damage its brand image, it may be powerless to stop this happening 
because it cannot restrict the retailer from discounting prices (since most jurisdictions prohibit 
producers using resale price maintenance and dictating minimum retail prices that retailers 
must apply).4  Indeed, the brand producer may be obliged to contribute to its own problems 
when it is unable to resist demands from a powerful retailer to fund the big price drops through 
its promotional support payments to the retailer (Competition Commission 2008, p. 170).  This 
may mean the brand producer pays a high penalty for price cuts that result in loss-making sales, 
especially when consumers learn to “lie in wait” and only buy the brand when it is on promotion 
(e.g. Lodish and Mela 2007).  For the retailer this makes the tactic very attractive, as the 
                                                     
4 However, there might be exceptions for allowing minimum resale prices in the case of luxury goods that require 
specialist sales services, e.g. the US case Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. (2007). 
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producer effectively pays for the damage to its own brand image while at the same time 
enhancing the retailer’s image in providing bargain offers in its stores.  
The empirical analysis in the next two sections considers whether there is evidence for 
strategic pricing that might correspond to these four tactics and more generally the pricing 
relationship between brands and corresponding imitation private label goods. 
 
4.  Matched-pairs pricing analysis 
In order to compare directly the treatment of brands with their private label equivalents, 
this section sets out the data used to analyse prices of matched pairs of branded items and 
private label equivalents sold over a substantial period.  The data relate to prices of the leading 
four UK grocery retailers over a full five-year period, covering 264 consecutive weeks from 
late 2003 to late 2008. These “Big 4” grocery retailers – Tesco, Asda, Sainsbury’s and 
Morrisons – jointly account for around three-quarters of all supermarket sales and around two-
thirds of all grocery sales in the UK over the time period (Competition Commission 2008; 
Chakraborty et al. 2015).   
An attractive feature in studying the UK context is its intensely competitive oligopolistic 
setting, so retailers will only adopt pricing tactics that ensure prices remain competitive with 
those of rivals, or otherwise risk losing market share.  In addition, comparing the prices of the 
Big 4 retailers is straightforward in this UK context since they practice uniform national 
pricing, so that an item has the same price across the retailer’s entire superstore network 
throughout the whole country (Competition Commission 2008).  Furthermore, all four of these 
retailers have very sophisticated private label programmes, and each is very capable of 
developing private label products that can challenge the product quality of the leading brands 
in almost all product categories (Mintel 2009).  Moreover, all four retailers have remarkably 
similar private label shares, accounting for close to half all their grocery sales by the end of the 
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study period (Nielsen 2009). (Table A1 in the Appendix provides further details on the sales 
performance of the four retailers).  
The source of the price data is the body of pricing data published online by Tesco for its 
“Pricecheck” price comparison service made publicly available and which we downloaded 
weekly over a full five-year period running from 10 November 2003 to 24 November 2008 
(after which the service ceased).  The Pricecheck price comparison service provided weekly 
updated price comparisons across the leading four supermarket retailers on a very wide range 
of grocery items. A number of other studies have also used this data source for pricing analysis, 
including Wildenbeest (2011), Seaton and Waterson (2012), and Chakraborty et al. (2014; 
2015).  However, a primary advantage in the present context is that it is one of the retailers (i.e. 
Tesco), and not a researcher, that is determining which private label goods are a precise match 
across each of its three rivals. This is important because it rules out any ambiguity and the 
potential for misclassification because Tesco would only cite matches when sure that its rivals’ 
private label goods were a close match to its own.  
A further advantage of using this data source is the timeframe it covers.  To observe a 
change in pricing relationships requires a change in the competitive environment.  Two major 
events sharpened price competition over this period.  Firstly, in March 2004, Morrisons, as the 
fifth largest retailer, completed its acquisition of Safeway, then the fourth largest retailer, after 
a detailed merger investigation by the Competition Commission (2003).  The effect of the 
merger was to consolidate the market, so the Big 5 became the Big 4.  However, it also created 
a scramble to build market share, especially while Morrisons was busy converting Safeway 
stores into its own Morrisons facia, resulting in an intensification of pricing competition 
(Chakraborty et al. 2014).  (Figure A1 in the Appendix shows how market shares of the four 
retailers evolved over this period, with Tesco gaining the most at the expense of Morrisons).  
Secondly, cost-led inflation in 2006 and through 2007-8 combined with the financial crisis 
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resulted in the retailers intensifying their price promotion activity and use of price-led 
advertising to maintain consumer spending and store loyalty (Chakraborty et al. 2015).   
Thus, over the five-year period, market-driven changes led pricing competition to 
become more intense, thereby presenting an opportunity for the retailers to adjust their pricing 
approaches towards brands and private label.  In particular, with consumers becoming more 
price sensitive, especially over the latter half of the period, one might expect the retailers to 
respond by encouraging consumers to substitute brands for cheaper private label equivalents.  
Indeed, this fits with the observed switch marketing activity at the time (Leyland 2006; Leyland 
et al. 2008) and also private label capturing an increasing share of sales, which the PLMA 
estimated increased from 38% to 43% in value terms between 2004 and 2008 (see Table A3 in 
the Appendix for details).  
In order to examine how brand and private label prices developed over the period, the 
price data used in this study consist of a sample of item-level weekly prices on 60 matched 
pairs of branded items and private label equivalents sold by all four retailers over the entire 
period.  These 120 products (when treating each retailer’s private label as the same good) 
represent the closest matching pairs of brand and private label equivalents taken from a 
constructed balanced panel dataset of just over 800 items, covering prices of all four retailers 
with minimal interpolation for any missing observations to generate continuous series.  This in 
turn draws on a much larger database of over 4,000 items but for which price data were not 
necessarily available for all retailers or for all weeks. The main criterion used to select each 
pairing was that the private label item should be a direct substitute for the branded item, in 
terms of same/similar size/weight, format/packaging, ingredients, type/variety, as well as a 
“standard” private label (i.e. not designated as a “premium” or “budget” private label unless 
there was no obvious alternative).  
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While clearly not a random or fully comprehensive sample of grocery goods, the sample 
of products nevertheless covers a very wide range of packaged grocery items from different 
product categories, with a broad mix of mass-market and more-specialist brands and their 
private label equivalents.  The prices range from £0.12 to £7.69, with the mean being £1.12 
across all 126,720 data points in the sample (i.e. the prices for 60 brands and 60 private label 
equivalents sold by each of four retailers over 264 weeks).  The products include tinned foods, 
breakfast cereals, cakes, biscuits, jam, rice, flour, oils, tea, coffee, soft drinks, alcohol, pet food, 
and cleaning goods.  Generally, there are one or two products from each category, but in some 
categories, notably tinned foods, breakfast cereals, table sauces and instant coffee, there is 
deeper category coverage with different product sizes, different quality or ingredient variants, 
and/or different brands. (Table A2 in the Appendix provides a full list of the items).  In total, 
the sample of 60 matched products covers some 34 narrowly defined product categories, which 
vary greatly in the share of sales taken by private label, from around two-thirds for cooking 
oils down to less than a tenth for toothpaste.  (Table A3 in the Appendix shows total volume 
and value private label shares for each of the 34 narrow product categories over the period). 
The effects of the Morrisons/Safeway merger emerge as a distinct feature in the observed 
pricing patterns.  In respect of the prices reported for Morrisons, for the first nine months these 
were prices collected from Safeway stores, independently operated until the conclusion of the 
merger on 8 March 2004.  Thus, from week 1 (10 November 2003) to week 19 (7 March 2004), 
prices are for Safeway as an independent retailer, then from week 20 to week 41 (16 August 
2004), the reported prices are for Safeway under the ownership and control of Morrisons, and 
from week 42 (23 August 2004) onwards, the reported prices are for Morrisons own stores.  In 
line with Chakraborty et al. (2014; 2015), we will see that the merger had an immediate and 
far-reaching impact on pricing behaviour, not just on Morrisons/Safeway, but for the other 
three retailers as well. 
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5. Pricing patterns  
Perhaps not surprisingly given the array of product categories covered and the very 
different nature of the brands in respect of their sizes, market share, penetration level, and 
extent of consumer loyalty, there is significant variation in the observed pricing patterns across 
the matched pairs.  The purpose of this section is to summarise the general trends that emerge 
and consider whether they might be indicative of the strategic pricing behaviour discussed in 
section 3 above. 
First, though, from a casual inspection of the price patterns for all 60 matched pairings, 
it was evident that a number of the pairings appeared to fit quite closely the four pricing tactics 
shown in Figures 1.  For illustration, Figures 2-5 each show a matched pair that appears to fit 
closely each of the four pricing tactics.  In each case, the four different coloured solid lines 
show the brand price for the four retailers, while the four dashed lines correspond to the private 
label price for the same four retailers.  
The pricing pattern shown in Figure 2 is not untypical in the sense of the high frequency 
of temporary price reductions (TPRs) applied to the brand (often as half price offers, or as here 
for a straight £1), compared to the much steadier prices on private label.  Thus even though the 
trend on the brand’s regular price might be upwards, many consumers will likely be buying the 
brand on discount price promotions (not least on storable ambient groceries for which the 
consumer can stock up), thus bringing down the average price paid. 
In Figure 3, there is again an increase in the regular price of the brand over time, but 
interspersed with price promotions especially towards the end of the period.  In contrast, 
though, the private label prices falls quite markedly over time, so expanding the brand/private-
label price gap very considerably.  In these cases, the falling price of the private label equivalent 
may be indicative of reduced product quality or the retailer repositioning the standard private 
label in the category pricing architecture (e.g. taking a lower margin on private label). 
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Figure 2. Example of Rising Brand Prices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Example of Falling Private Label Prices 
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Figure 4. Example of Private Label Prices Tracking Brand Prices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Example of Time-Varying Brand Prices 
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Figure 4 shows a case where the prices on the brand and private label equivalent closely 
track each other over time.  In this particular instance, the sharp price increases in 2007-8 
coincided with sharply increasing global supply prices for the commodity concerned 
(sunflower oil) and a similar pattern occurred on other commodity products as well during this 
inflationary period.  In these cases, parallel pricing for brands and private labels were 
essentially a feature of changing supply/wholesale prices and applied equally across retailers.  
In Figure 5, the brand operates with so many temporary price reductions that often its 
price is below the private label equivalent, while at other times when it is not on special offer 
then its price is significantly higher.  This price volatility increases over time, while the price 
gap narrows on regular prices between the brand and the private label equivalent.   With prices 
on the brand changing so frequently with so many price promotions, the meaning of a “regular” 
price becomes less clear, and consumers may be inclined to wait for price promotions on the 
brand and perhaps experiment with buying private label when the brand price is high and the 
price gap with private label is wide. 
Other cases demonstrated similar patterns to those shown in Figures 2-5, but there were 
also more mixed patterns where price trends for brands and private label were variable.  
These individual patterns are interesting but, of course, at best only provide 
circumstantial support for the presence of strategic pricing, since each of them could quite 
easily have a more innocent explanation for the observed pattern, e.g. due to a change in the 
demand or cost position of the individual products.  Accordingly, to move beyond the 
individual product level, that might simply represent a spurious or one-off association, the rest 
of this section examines price trends for the sample as a whole to see whether any dominant 
patterns of pricing behaviour emerge. 
The sample-level analysis that follows centres on four key features of the pricing of 
brands and private label equivalents with the following key results to emerge: 
 21 
 
1. Price correlation – prices on matching brands and private labels are moderately 
correlated within each retailer, but brand prices are strongly correlated across 
competing retailers, and so too are private label prices, indicating a retail focus on item-
by-item prices across rivals 
2. Price gap – the price gap between brands and private labels increases on average over 
time on regular prices, but there is an increasing tendency for brands to be used for deep 
short-run price promotions (typically “half price” or “£1” special offers) 
3. Price matching – price matching across all four retailers on an item-by-item basis 
becomes an increasingly strong feature until mid-2007, after which it becomes less 
common as price dispersion increased during an inflationary period in 2008 
4. Price volatility – brand prices are much more variable than private label prices both in 
terms of small and large price changes 
 
5.1 Intra-retailer and inter-retailer price correlations 
Usually when goods are clear substitutes they will share common price movements in 
response to demand and cost changes, so over time their prices should follow each other quite 
closely and tend to be highly correlated.  Table 3 reports the sample average correlation 
coefficients for products prices in respect of intra-retailer correlation between the brands 
(designated by “B”) and their private label equivalents (designated by “OL” for “own label”) 
as well as across inter-retailer correlations (between Tesco, Sainsbury, Morrisons, and Asda).5  
As a precaution, and in line with Lan and Dobson (2017) analysing the intensity of grocery 
                                                     
5 The correlation coefficient between two price series X and Y is 𝜌𝑋,𝑌 = 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑋, 𝑌)/(𝜎𝑋𝜎𝑌), where 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑋, 𝑌) is 
the covariance of X and Y, 𝜎𝑋 is the standard deviation of X, and 𝜎𝑌 is the standard deviation of Y. The reported 
values in Table 1 are for the average correlation coefficient values for the 60 corresponding products.  
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price competition, the discussion of the results in the table focuses on relative values rather 
than absolute values in case there are spurious correlation issues affecting the levels.6 
Table 3. Price Correlation Analysis - Average Correlation Coefficients across Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The striking result is that brand and private label prices seem to be only moderately 
correlated within each retailer but more strongly correlated for the same/equivalent product 
sold across the retailers; i.e. intra-retailer brand/private-label correlation is positive but 
moderate, while inter-retailer item-by-item correlation is positive and relatively strong.   The 
first finding runs counter to the notion of umbrella pricing being dominant, where private label 
prices shield under brand prices and move in step with each other.  In contrast, the second 
finding shows that the prices for the same brand across the retailers are more strongly correlated 
and equally prices for the same private label across the retailers are more strongly correlated.  
This suggests, as discussed above in section 3, that retailers are keen to maintain their prices in 
line with each other on an item-by-item basis and if strategic pricing is going on at the product 
category level, then all four retailers are likely to be employing the same tactic.  
The moderate correlation on brand and private label prices should not come as a surprise 
if the retailers are using these products to target different consumers as part of their category 
                                                     
6  In particular, the infrequent price changes with weekly data and the possibility of non-stationarity and co-
integration issues could affect the correlation values (Bishop and Walker 2010, chapter 10). 
Tesco B Sains B Morr B ASDA B Tesco OL Sains OL Morr OL ASDA OL
Tesco B 1.000 0.628 0.503 0.682 0.180 0.132 0.075 0.192
Sains B 0.628 1.000 0.523 0.620 0.227 0.217 0.129 0.250
Morr B 0.503 0.523 1.000 0.503 0.220 0.235 0.232 0.239
ASDA B 0.682 0.620 0.503 1.000 0.183 0.154 0.083 0.212
Tesco OL 0.180 0.227 0.220 0.183 1.000 0.652 0.505 0.830
Sains OL 0.132 0.217 0.235 0.154 0.652 1.000 0.583 0.622
Morr OL 0.075 0.129 0.232 0.083 0.505 0.583 1.000 0.493
ASDA OL 0.192 0.250 0.239 0.212 0.830 0.622 0.493 1.000
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pricing strategy for devising pricing architectures intended to segment and better target 
consumers by their price/quality preferences.  For example, the retailers could be pricing brands 
higher to target brand-seeking consumers and private label lower to target value-seeking 
consumers (i.e. in line with Soberman and Parker 2006; Gabrielsen and Sørgard 2007, Perloff 
et al. 2012; Dobson and Chakraborty 2014).  In this case, consumers may view the products as 
substitutable, to a greater or lesser degree depending on their individual preferences.  However, 
the retailers’ perspective could be that the brand and private label pair are complementary in 
the sense that they represent a combination designed to appeal to the widest possible consumer 
base.  Thus, the modest correlation does not mean that the products are not in direct or even 
intense competition with each other, only that the retailer adjusts prices in a manner to manage 
category sales while being highly responsive to rival retailers’ prices on an item-by-item basis.  
5.2 Brand-PL price gap 
Measuring the brand premium as (brand price – PL price)/(PL price) expressed as a 
percentage and averaged over the 60 items, Figure 6 shows that the price gap between each 
brand and private label pair has on average increased substantially, up by 45%.  This widening 
price gap is consistent with both the “rip-off brand” tactic and the “private label value 
champion” tactic.   
Figure 7 shows the mean brand and private label prices for the sample, which lends some 
qualified support to both tactics, indicating that retailers have pushed up brand prices on 
average over time, while pushing down private label prices.  The figure also shows the 
immediate impact that Morrisons made on acquiring Safeway, lowering both its brand and 
private label prices as soon as the merger was completed, which in turn seems to have spurred 
Sainsbury to lower its prices.  However, throughout the five-year period we can observe that 
Tesco and Asda maintained slightly lower private label prices on average than Morrisons and 
Sainsbury’s, while average brand prices amongst the four retailers appear closer. 
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Figure 6. Mean Brand-Private Label Price Gap (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Sample Mean Values of Brand and Private Label Prices 
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5.3 Inter-retailer price dispersion and price matching 
To consider more formally the extent of price differences across the four retailers, Figure 
8 shows the weekly average coefficient of variation (as the ratio of the standard deviation to 
the mean of the retailers’ prices) respectively for the 60 brands and 60 private labels.  Following 
the Morrisons/Safeway merger, price differences considerably narrowed on both brands and 
private labels, with the former displaying less price dispersion until 2008, when price 
dispersion across the retailers increased for both product types, but especially for brands. 
Figure 8. Price Dispersion across Retailers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In respect of the extent of exact price matching across the retailers, Figures 9 and 10 
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Figure 9. Exact Price Matching on Brands by Retailer Combinations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Exact Price Matching on Private Label by Retailer Combinations 
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The two figures shows that at the beginning of the five-year period there was very little 
price matching, but in the wake of the Morrisons/Safeway merger exact price matching became 
much more common for both brands and private label, peaking in 2006/7, before falling away 
in 2008 as the financial crisis deepened.  Taking the period as a whole, this extent of price 
matching highlights the very strong interdependent nature of retail price competition amongst 
these four retailers. 
 
5.4 Brand and private label price volatility 
A clear indication why price matching might have broken down in 2008 comes from 
Figure 11, which shows the number of price cuts and price rises as a three-month moving 
average (to smooth out the week-by-week differences).  Prices are much more volatile towards 
the end of the period, which coincides with inflation in global commodity prices and the 
financial crisis (Chakraborty et al. 2015). The upshot is that average retail prices increased 
sharply, as Figure 7 showed.  However, the indication given by Figure 11 in respect of the 
number of price cuts and price rises is that there were far more price cuts during this period, 
reaching a point in mid-2008 with nearly half of all brand prices cut in a single week.   
So how can these seemingly contradictory findings be reconciled?  The answer lies in 
the size of the price cuts.  As Figure 12 shows, the retailers were heavily engaged in cutting 
prices by a single penny.  However, as the figure also shows, most single penny price cutting 
applied to brands and not to private label.  Thus, as inflation and the economic crisis deepened, 
the retailers responded by adjusting mostly brand prices, either making tiny price cuts of a 
penny at a time or running with larger promotional discounts while at the same time increasing 
the prices on other brands.  The net effect was increasing average prices, as Figure 7 shows, 
but the very high volume of price cuts and discounts appear the retailers attempting to signal 
to consumers that they were trying to price as competitively possible despite the inflation. 
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Figure 11. Price Volatility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 12. Single Penny Price Cuts 
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Across the whole five-year period, it is clear that the number and size of price changes 
were fundamentally different for the brands compared to their private label equivalents.  Figure 
13 shows the cumulative frequency for 1p through to 30p price changes for brands and private 
labels, with price cuts shown on the left side and price rises shown on the right side.  The figure 
reveals that there were far more price cuts on brands than on private labels, but a large portion 
of these brand price changes were very small, typically between 1p and 4p.  Conversely, the 
price increases on brands tend to be larger than on private label. 
Figure 13. Cumulative Frequency of Brand and Private Label Price Movements 
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Figure 14. Price Brand Churn across Retailers – Cumulative Frequency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Private Label Price Churn across Retailers – Cumulative Frequency 
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The greater price volatility on brands than on private label is consistent with the “dubious 
brand value” tactic.  However, this might also be a symptom of retailers seeking to make 
flattering price comparisons over rivals in terms of who offers the greatest number of lower 
prices than its rivals, as evident from the price comparison advertising and publicity campaigns 
used by the retailers over this period (Chakraborty et al. 2015). 
6. Conclusion 
This study demonstrates that a change in the competitive environment can trigger a 
distinct change in the pricing applied to brands and private labels.  Whether by deliberate design 
or an unintended outcome of competitive pricing, the treatment brands receive could adversely 
affect their immediate or longer-term market share and profitability.  Hiking the brand premium 
(here by an average of 45%) will inevitably make private label goods appear to offer better 
value.  Operating high frequency deep discount promotions will compensate by boosting brand 
sales in the short term but could undermine longer-term brand loyalty and lower consumers’ 
reference prices, which may boost profits for retailers but not for brand producers (Ball 2009b). 
The options for brand producers in responding to strategic pricing by retailers look to be 
limited.  As with trying to defend against other forms of switch marketing, threats to withhold 
supplies or reduce promotional support do not look credible in this environment even for strong 
brand owners. Instead, the best prospects for brand owners lie in innovating, improving product 
quality and advertising to distinguish their brands from private label imitations and maintain 
consumer loyalty so they remain distinct must-stock products (Kumar and Steenkamp 2007). 
Should switch marketing and retailer strategic pricing matter to consumers?  Perhaps not 
if product choice is wide and prices represent good value.  However, consumer detriment could 
arise. Firstly, using umbrella pricing with private label simply tracking brand prices and not 
following costs is likely to lead to poor value for consumers (Competition Commission 2000).  
Secondly, intentionally spreading the price gap to distort pricing architectures may mislead 
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consumers (through their price-quality associations) as to the value actually on offer.  Thirdly, 
the effect of incessant yo-yo pricing by repeatedly changing the brand price up and down may 
reduce its perceived value.  Fourthly, pushing up brand prices to divert sales towards private 
label might end up resulting in brand withdrawal and so eventually reduced choice.  Fifthly, 
product quality may decline over the longer term when the moral hazard problem from retailers 
exploiting their double agent position deters future brand investment by brand owners. 
The retailer’s chief objective in using strategic pricing as switch marketing appears to be 
less about displacing brands and more about segmenting consumers. As a form of self-selection 
(second-degree) price discrimination, this can be economically benign when it enhances 
product choice and generates additional sales. However, as Dobson and Chakraborty (2014) 
demonstrate in a range of contexts, this can be detrimental when it raises average prices by 
hiking brand prices to exploit brand loyal consumers while driving value-conscious consumers 
to buy cheaper private label.  The policy remedy could be to give brand producers greater 
control over the retail prices of their goods, such as being permitted to use maximum resale 
price maintenance as a way of constraining what retailers can charge for brands.  Olbrich and 
Burr (2005) go further and argue for relaxing the prohibition on fixed resale price maintenance 
to allow brand owners to fix resale prices as a means to stop retailers using excessive and 
artificial high-low pricing on brands.  
Future research might wish to extend the scope of the present study beyond utilising price 
data.  In particular, access to both price and sales data could allow for studying the effectiveness 
of the different pricing tactics outlined in this paper in favouring private label sales and the 
consequences for brand sales.  Similarly, extending the study period or considering a different 
timeframe or another country could provide fresh insights about how retailers price brands and 
private labels in different market conditions and competitive circumstances. Such research 
would be very timely in view of the seemingly inexorable global growth of private label.  
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APPENDIX – Further information on the market and product sample 
 
Table A1. Sales Performance of Top 4 UK Grocery Retailers, 2008 
 
Measure Tesco Asda Sainsbury’s Morrisons 
Share of trade (%) 28.1 15.5 14.3 10.4 
Penetration – all shoppers (%) 84.9 67.9 63.7 60.2 
Average visits per shopper p.a. 39.9 25.7 27.5 24.6 
Average spend per shopper (£) 1265.74 871.83 862.18 606.05 
Average spend per visit (£m) 31.75 33.95 31.34 26.85 
Penetration – main shoppers (%) 34 18 16 13 
Retailer loyalty – main shoppers (%) 65 64 66 60 
% Spend on promotional offer 28 28 30 30 
Own label share (%) 47 47 48 47 
 
Source: Adapted from Nielsen (2009) 
 
 
 
 
Figure A1. Market Share Trends of Top 4 UK Grocery Retailers, 2003-2008 
 
 
Source: Nielsen (2009) 
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Table A2. List of products in the matched-pairs sample 
BRAND ITEM PRIVATE (OWN) LABEL ITEM 
 MR KIPLING BRAMLEY APPLE PIES X6  OL BRAMLEY APPLE PIES 6 PACK 
 MR KIPLING CHERRY BAKEWELLS 5/6 PACK  OL CHERRY BAKEWELL TARTS 6 PACK 
 HEINZ BAKED BEANS 415G/420G  OL BAKED BEANS IN TOMATO SAUCE 420G-439G 
 HEINZ BAKED BEANS IN TOMATO SCE 200G/205G  OL BAKED BEANS IN TOMATO SAUCE 220G 
 HEINZ BAKED BEANS & 4 PORK SAUSAGES 200G/205G  OL BAKED BEANS & 4 PORK SAUSAGES 200G/220G 
 HEINZ BAKED BEANS & PORK SAUSAGES 8'S 420G  OL BAKED BEANS & 8 PORK SAUSAGES 420G CAN 
 HEINZ WEIGHT WATCHERS BAKED BEANS 420G  OL H/E BAKED BEANS LESS SUGAR/SALT 420G 
 HEINZ RAVIOLI IN TOMATO SAUCE 200G CAN  OL RAVIOLI IN TOMATO SCE 400G CAN 
 HEINZ SPAGHETTI BOLOGNESE 400G/405G CAN  OL SPAGHETTI BOLOGNESE 410G CAN 
 HEINZ SPAGHETTI IN TOMATO SAUCE 400G  OL SPAGHETTI IN TOMATO SAUCE ANY 410G/439G 
 HEINZ SPAGHETTI HOOPS IN TOMATO SCE 400G  OL SPAGHETTI RINGS IN TOMATO SAUCE 410G CAN 
 HEINZ SPAGHETTI & SAUSAGES 400G CAN  OL SPAGHETTI RINGS & SAUSAGES 410G-425G CAN 
 BATCHELORS MUSHY PROCESSED PEAS 300G CAN  OL MARROWFAT PROC PEAS 300G 
 MCVITIES RICH TEA BISCUITS 300G  OL RICH TEA FINGER BISCUITS 250G 
 MCVITIES DIGESTIVE BISCUITS 500G  OL DIGESTIVE BISCUITS 500G 
 KELLOGGS CORN FLAKES 500G  OL CORNFLAKES 500G 
 WEETABIX FAMILY SIZE PACKET OF 24  OL WHEAT BISCUITS 24'S 
 WEETABIX GIANT PACK 48'S  OL WHEAT BISCUITS 48'S 
 KELLOGGS RICE KRISPIES 440G/450G  OL RICE KRISPIES TYPE 440G 
 KELLOGGS CRUNCHY NUT CORNFLAKES 500G  OL HONEY & NUT CORNFLAKES 500G 
 KELLOGGS RICE KRISPIES 600G  OL RICE KRISPIES TYPE 600G 
 ALPEN ORIGINAL MUESLI 750G  OL SWISS STYLE MUESLI 750G 
 KELLOGGS FROSTIES 500G  OL FROSTED FLAKES 500G 
 KELLOGGS FRUIT N FIBRE 500G  OL FRUIT & FIBRE BREAKFAST CEREAL 500G 
 FLORA PURE SUNFLOWER OIL 1LT BOTTLE  OL SUNFLOWER COOKING OIL BOTTLE 1LTR 
 BERIO EXTRA VIRGIN OLIVE OIL 500ML  OL EXTRA VIRGIN OLIVE OIL 500ML 
 FILIPPO BERIO MILD & LIGHT OLIVE OIL 500ML  OL MILD AND LIGHT OLIVE OIL 500ML 
 SAXA TABLE SALT 750G DRUM  OL TABLE SALT 750G 
 BAXTERS CRINKLE CUT BEETROOT 340G  OL PICKLED SLICED BEETROOT 340G 
 HELLMANNS LIGHT MAYONNAISE 200G  OL LIGHT MAYONNAISE 250ML 
 HELLMANNS REAL/ORIG MAYONNAISE JAR 200G  OL MAYONNAISE 250ML JAR ORIGINAL 
 HELLMANNS REAL/ORIG MAYONNAISE JAR 400G  OL MAYONNAISE 500ML (EXC REDUCED CAL) 
 HEINZ SALAD CREAM BOTTLE 285G  OL SALAD CREAM 283G 
 HEINZ TOMATO KETCHUP BOTTLE 340G/342G  OL TOMATO KETCHUP GLASS BOTTLE 325G-340G 
 AMBROSIA CREAMED RICE 425G  OL CRMD RICE PUDDING 420G-439G EXC LOW FAT 
 AMBROSIA LOW FAT CREAMED RICE 425G  OL LOW FAT RICE PUDDING 425G 
 BIRDS INSTANT CUSTARD 75G SACHET  OL INSTANT CUSTARD POWDER 66G-90G SINGLE PK 
 HARTLEYS BEST JAM ANY VARIETY 340G  OL JAM 454G ANY FLAVOUR (EXCEPT STRAWBERRY) 
 DUERRS ENGLISH MARMALADE 454G  OL THICK CUT ORANGE MARMALADE 454G 
 SHIPPAMS SPREAD 75G ANY  OL PASTE'S 75G JAR 
 UNCLE BENS BOIL IN BAG LONG GRAIN RICE 500G  OL EASY COOK BOIL IN BAG RICE 500G 
 UNCLE BENS LONG GRAIN RICE 1KG  OL AMERICAN EASY COOK LONG GRAIN RICE 1KG 
 MCDOUGALLS FLOUR 1.5KG  OL PLAIN/SELF RAISING FLOUR 1.5KG 
 DOMESTOS BLEACH 2 LTR  OL THICK BLEACH 2 LTR 
 FLASH BATHROOM SPRAY 500ML  OL BATHROOM CLEANER TRIGGER 500ML 
 JOHNSONS PLEDGE ANY 250ML  OL FURNITURE POLISH 300ML ANY 
 MR MUSCLE WINDOW CLEANER 500ML TRIGGER  OL WINDOW CLEANER 500ML 
 ST IVEL UTTERLY BUTTERLY 500G  OL BUTTERY TYPE SPREAD 500G 
 COLGATE TOOTHPASTE TOTAL/STRIPE 50ML  OL TOOTHPASTE FRESHMINT 50ML 
 GORDONS DRY LONDON GIN 35CL BOTTLE  OL DRY LONDON GIN 35CL BOTTLE 
 BLACK TOWER 75CL  OL LIEBFRAUMILCH 75CL 
 PEDIGREE CHUM MIXER ANY PACK 2.25KG  OL DOG MIXER 2.5KG 
 NESCAFE INSTANT COFFEE 200G  OL RICH ROAST GRANULES 200G 
 NESCAFE GOLD BLEND INSTANT COFFEE 100G  OL CLASSIC GOLD COFEE 100G 
 NESCAFE DECAF GOLD BLEND COFFEE 100G  OL DECAFF CLASSIC GOLD COFFEE 100G 
 NESCAFE DECAF COFFEE 100G  OL DECAFF RICH ROAST GRANULES 100G 
 R WHITES LEMONADE/DIET LEMONADE 2LT  OL LEMONADE 2LT 
 PEPSI COLA 2 LITRE BOTTLE  OL COLA 2LT 
 TAYLORS YORKSHIRE LEAF TEA 250G  OL PREMIUM LEAF TEA 250G 
 BROOKE BOND PG TIPS PYRAMID 40 TEABAGS 125G  OL PREMIUM TEA BAGS 40'S 125G 
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Table A3. UK private label volume and value shares for product categories in matched-
pairs sample, 2004-2008 
NARROW PRODUCT CATEGORY VOLUME SHARE VALUE SHARE 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Dairy: blended spreads/butter substitute 21.5 21.4 20.1 21.5 22.6 17.4 17.2 16.5 18.4 20.3 
Breakfast cereals: ready to eat 32.5 33.4 35.2 34.6 36.2 26.9 26.6 27.7 27.0 28.3 
Cookery aids: cooking oils liquid 73.7 72.5 73.4 72.2 72.3 64.9 63.1 65.2 66.2 70.1 
Cookery aids: flour excl cornflour 57.2 56.6 56.8 60.3 64.5 40.5 39.3 39.8 43.0 47.5 
Cookery aids: olive oil 64.0 65.3 68.8 62.7 58.7 55.5 57.6 63.2 58.7 57.7 
Cookery aids: salt table 52.1 57.5 60.5 58.5 57.3 32.0 35.8 37.0 34.7 33.1 
Desserts: custard powder 34.6 31.3 44.6 40.1 43.7 23.2 15.9 17.3 15.6 10.7 
Desserts: milk puddings canned 56.0 59.6 59.0 54.9 56.0 41.8 41.2 41.7 38.4 40.4 
Pasta: canned 44.9 44.7 41.3 44.3 43.5 32.1 33.2 30.7 31.7 30.7 
Pickles: beetroot 68.5 68.5 67.8 68.3 70.8 58.1 57.0 54.5 53.8 59.2 
Preserves: jams 53.6 54.6 53.2 52.7 54.3 44.8 44.9 44.8 43.4 45.2 
Preserves: marmalades 41.3 44.6 43.5 46.2 48.9 34.0 34.6 33.3 34.5 37.4 
Sauces: salad: mayonnaise 48.3 46.9 45.9 47.4 46.1 30.9 29.1 29.8 29.8 31.2 
Sauces: salad: salad cream 40.5 40.3 43.0 42.5 42.4 22.0 22.4 24.8 24.8 24.9 
Sauces: table: tomato/ketchup 43.1 41.0 41.2 39.8 41.5 25.1 23.5 23.1 21.6 22.8 
Spreads savoury :pastes/spread/pate 60.1 51.9 48.2 49.2 48.2 47.6 44.1 41.9 38.7 37.2 
Veg canned/jar: peas mushy 67.3 62.7 61.0 52.4 51.1 53.0 51.8 54.0 48.4 47.9 
Veg dried: rice 68.5 67.5 65.9 63.7 67.4 57.9 56.9 53.2 49.3 57.6 
Biscuits: sweet: digestives excl choc 57.3 59.7 57.6 61.1 63.8 44.9 44.9 41.5 42.5 44.2 
Biscuits: sweet: tea & coffee biscuits 65.9 60.8 60.5 60.5 66.3 57.6 49.9 46.1 42.9 49.0 
Drinks-hot: coffee inst excl coffee subst. 22.6 22.5 22.9 23.2 25.9 16.6 15.2 15.4 15.7 17.4 
Drinks-hot: tea bags 30.8 30.4 30.3 28.5 26.9 24.6 22.8 22.8 21.4 20.8 
Drinks-hot: tea packets 29.1 31.0 28.5 29.9 26.2 27.0 27.6 24.8 25.6 23.0 
Drinks-cold: carbonates bottled excl mixers 42.6 42.8 46.6 46.4 44.3 25.4 24.9 26.7 26.4 25.0 
Cakes packaged: fruit pies small 66.9 66.0 70.5 66.3 66.8 63.1 62.5 67.3 64.2 64.7 
Cakes packaged: tarts small 64.6 69.1 71.1 63.6 61.6 60.1 65.1 64.6 58.1 57.1 
Wines: German 55.1 52.9 59.4 57.8 55.8 54.1 51.8 59.3 59.1 58.8 
Gin British 51.2 57.4 57.9 60.1 56.7 46.0 48.7 49.0 52.3 50.0 
H/h-cleaners: bleach 63.3 63.7 61.9 60.0 56.3 53.7 54.7 54.3 51.8 50.5 
H/h-cleaners: multipurpose liquid 31.7 28.6 28.8 27.7 26.4 19.9 16.6 17.2 15.3 15.3 
H/h-cleaners: polishes floor/furniture 30.5 30.8 29.2 27.3 24.3 19.8 21.4 18.6 19.3 16.9 
H/h-cleaners: window 27.9 35.4 38.9 33.7 32.6 22.0 27.9 30.4 24.6 24.1 
Dog meals/mixers 28.9 28.2 31.2 32.6 36.7 21.3 19.0 20.3 19.2 22.8 
Oral care: toothpastes & powders 16.0 16.4 17.4 16.7 16.3 9.3 8.8 8.9 8.1 7.6 
TOTAL UK GROCERY MARKET 41.5 41.8 43.3 43.1 47.8 38.0 37.8 39.6 39.3 43.4 
 
Source: Private Label Manufacturers Association (PLMA) International Private Label Yearbook 
(various years) 
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